Banks and Life Insurers 00000000 Money Market Funds 0000 Pension Funds

Conclusion O

▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□▶ □ のQ@

Appendix

Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy on Financial Institutions

Gabriel Chodorow-Reich (NBER WP, 2014)

New York University Sargent Reading Group

presented by Miguel de Faria e Castro

September 16, 2014

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
•00	0000000	0000	000	0	

Policy response to the 2007-09 Crisis

- Fed relied on unconventional monetary policy
 - Zero fed funds rate, asset purchases, agency bonds, forward guidance...
- Based on the idea that lower long-term rates may lead to faster recovery
- Trade-off: financial stability
 - Lower rates may induce excessive risk-taking behavior
 - Risk-taking beyond what ultimate holders of the risk would find optimal

Motivation O●O	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds 0000	Pension Funds 000	Conclusion O	Appendix
This pa	aper				

What was the impact of unconventional monetary policy on four classes of financial institutions?

- Banks and Life Insurers: Positive effects on yields and stock prices after Fed announcements, especially in 2009
- MMFs and Pension Funds: Moderate reaching for yield behavior in 2007-09, behavior has disappeared by 2013

No trade-off by 2013: risk-taking dissipated and solvency benefits are still felt

Banks and Life Insurers

Motivation

000

Money Market Funds 0000

Appendix

How does Monetary Policy affect Financial Institutions

- 1. Hurdle rate for risky projects $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ optimal increase in risk in the economy
- 2. Incentives to "reach for yield" \Rightarrow suboptimal increase in risk-taking
- 3. General equilibrium effects on asset prices \Rightarrow value of legacy assets \uparrow
 - Real spending, real profits increase
 - Discount rates decrease
 - Unemployment, delinquency rates decrease
 - Aggregate demand effects
 - Stealth recapitalization
- 4. Opportunity cost of holding collateral $\downarrow \Rightarrow$ leverage \uparrow

Moti	/ation
000	

Banks and Life Insurers •0000000 Money Market Funds 0000 Pension Funds 000 Conclusion O

Appendix

Banks and Life Insurers - Methodology

- Measure impact of (surprise) monetary policy announcements
- High frequency event studies
- Identification:
 - 1. Window narrow enough to prevent contamination by other shocks
 - 2. Window wide enough to allow markets to process information
- Focus on equity, bond and CDS prices
 - 1. Equity and Bonds: difference in average trading prices between [-7, -2] and [18, 23] minute windows
 - 2. CDS: quasi-intraday window using closing price data from Tokyo, London, and New York

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
000	0000000	0000	000	0	

Life Insurers


- Maturity mismatch: shorter term assets than liabilities
- ▶ $r \downarrow \Rightarrow$ interest spread \downarrow
- ▶ Life insurers can try to offset this by reaching for the yield...

On the other hand...

- Lost considerable asset value
- ► GE effects ⇒ monetary easing may have had a *positive effect* on life insurers

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
000	0000000	0000	000	0	


Life Insurers: CDS



|▲□▶ ▲圖▶ ▲≣▶ ▲≣▶ | 重||||の��

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
000	0000000	0000	000	0	


Life Insurers: Bond Yields



◆□ > ◆□ > ◆豆 > ◆豆 > ̄豆 = のへで

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
000	00000000	0000	000	0	

Life Insurers: Equity Prices



Banks and Life Insurers 00000000

Money Market Funds

Pension Funds

Conclusion

Appendix

Life Insurers: Results

$$\Delta P_i = \beta_0 + \varepsilon_i$$

	Treasur	^{,a} I	Life insure	rs	Bank ł	olding co	mpanies	Μ	arket
		$\mathrm{CDS}^{\mathrm{b}}$	Bond^{c}	Stock^d	CDS^{b}	$\operatorname{Bond}^{\mathbf{c}}$	$\operatorname{Stock}^{\operatorname{d}}$	CDX ^e	$\rm Stock^{f}$
12/1/08	-9.2		52.6	-0.4		18.1^{+}	-0.6^{**}		-0.5^{**}
12/16/08	-16.8	-7.2	-42.9	3.6^{**}	-0.7	-9.1	2.2^{**}	-3.9	1.3^{**}
1/28/09	3.1	-3.1	-7.6	-1.2^{**}	-9.4^{*}	-0.9	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3^{**}
3/18/09	-22.8	-24.5^{+}	-33.9	4.0^{**}	-2.6^{*}	-16.6	2.5^{**}	-3.7	1.5^{**}
9/23/09	-8.9	-0.2	3.3	0.6^{**}	0.2	-12.5	0.6^{**}	2.5	0.6^{**}
8/10/10	-5.8	-0.8	-25.1	0.8^{**}	-0.2^{*}	-1.5	0.9^{**}	-0.5	0.7^{**}
9/21/10	-1.8	2.5^{*}	-10.5	0.6^{**}	-0.2	-16.1	0.7^{**}	1.1	0.5^{**}
8/9/11	-14.4	-1.6^{*}	-98.8	-2.0^{**}	1.3	-5.5	-1.7^{**}	-2.8	-1.4^{**}
1/25/12	-6.3	0.9	15.4	-0.6^{**}	-1.1^{*}	-2.5	0.0	-2.3	0.3^{**}
9/13/12	6.4	-2.7^{+}	-39.4	1.3^{**}	-4.1^{**}	-10.5	1.0^{**}	-7.0	0.5^{**}
5/22/13	6.6	-1.1	5.5	-0.4^{**}	-1.8^{**}	-5.5	-0.5^{**}	-2.8	-0.5^{**}
6/19/13	7.8	1.6**	13.5^{+}	0.1	2.9**	-24.4	0.2^{**}	7.4	-0.2^{**}
7/10/13	-7.3	-1.5^{**}		0.3	0.4	-5.2		0.5	0.3^{**}
9/18/13	-14.0	-2.1	-8.0^{**}	0.4	-0.9	-33.5^{+}	0.9^{**}	-5.7	1.0^{**}
Initial QE ^g	-39.7	-31.7^{*}	-72.8^{*}	7.6**	-3.3^{*}	-25.0	4.5^{**}	-7.6	2.9^{**}
Taper ^h	14.4	0.5	18.6^{*}	-0.3^{**}	0.8	-28.7	-0.4^{**}	4.6	-0.6^{**}
Sample end	-21.4	-3.6^{*}	-8.0^{**}	0.4	-0.5	-37.0^{*}	0.9^{**}	-5.2	1.2
					-				· · · ·

ivation O Banks and Life Insurers

Money Market Funds 0000 Pension Funds 000 Conclusion O

▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□▶ □ のQ@

Appendix

Bank Holding Companies

- Converse maturity mismatch
- Low interest rates can function as "stealth recapitalizations"
- GE effects on legacy asset values, as well as higher returns due to lower delinquency rates
- Low opportunity cost of collateral may increase leverage and induce suboptimal risk-taking

Banks and Life Insurers 0000000

Money Market Funds

Pension Funds

Conclusion

Appendix

Bank Holding Companies: Results

 $\Delta P_i = \beta_0 + \varepsilon_i$

	Treasu	ry ^a I	life insure	rs	Bank ł	olding co	mpanies	Μ	arket
		$\mathrm{CDS}^{\mathrm{b}}$	$\operatorname{Bond}^{\mathbf{c}}$	Stock ^d	$\overline{\mathrm{CDS}^{\mathrm{b}}}$	$\operatorname{Bond}^{\mathbf{c}}$	Stock ^d	CDXe	$\rm Stock^{f}$
12/1/08	-9.2		52.6	-0.4		18.1^{+}	-0.6^{**}		-0.5^{**}
12/16/08	-16.8	-7.2	-42.9	3.6^{**}	-0.7	-9.1	2.2^{**}	-3.9	1.3^{**}
1/28/09	3.1	-3.1	-7.6	-1.2^{**}	-9.4^{*}	-0.9	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3^{**}
3/18/09	-22.8	-24.5^{+}	-33.9	4.0^{**}	-2.6^{*}	-16.6	2.5^{**}	-3.7	1.5^{**}
9/23/09	-8.9	-0.2	3.3	0.6^{**}	0.2	-12.5	0.6^{**}	2.5	0.6^{**}
8/10/10	-5.8	-0.8	-25.1	0.8^{**}	-0.2^{*}	-1.5	0.9^{**}	-0.5	0.7^{**}
9/21/10	-1.8	2.5^{*}	-10.5	0.6^{**}	-0.2	-16.1	0.7^{**}	1.1	0.5^{**}
8/9/11	-14.4	-1.6^{*}	-98.8	-2.0^{**}	1.3	-5.5	-1.7^{**}	-2.8	-1.4^{**}
1/25/12	-6.3	0.9	15.4	-0.6^{**}	-1.1^{*}	-2.5	0.0	-2.3	0.3^{**}
9/13/12	6.4	-2.7^{+}	-39.4	1.3^{**}	-4.1^{**}	-10.5	1.0^{**}	-7.0	0.5^{**}
5/22/13	6.6	-1.1	5.5	-0.4^{**}	-1.8^{**}	-5.5	-0.5^{**}	-2.8	-0.5^{**}
6/19/13	7.8	1.6^{**}	13.5^{+}	0.1	2.9**	-24.4	0.2^{**}	7.4	-0.2^{**}
7/10/13	-7.3	-1.5^{**}		0.3	0.4	-5.2		0.5	0.3^{**}
9/18/13	-14.0	-2.1	-8.0^{**}	0.4	-0.9	-33.5^{+}	0.9**	-5.7	1.0^{**}
Initial QE ^g	-39.7	-31.7^{*}	-72.8^{*}	7.6**	-3.3^{*}	-25.0	4.5^{**}	-7.6	2.9^{**}
Taper ^h	14.4	0.5	18.6^{*}	-0.3^{**}	0.8	-28.7	-0.4^{**}	4.6	-0.6^{**}
Sample end ⁱ	-21.4	-3.6^{*}	-8.0^{**}	0.4	-0.5	-37.0^{*}	0.9^{**}	-5.2	1.2

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆臣▶ ◆臣▶ 臣 の�?

otivation DO Banks and Life Insurers 00000000 Money Market Funds

Pension Funds

Conclusion O

▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□▶ ▲□▶ □ のQ@

Appendix

Money Market Funds - Institutional

- Stable NAV of \$1 per share
- Subject to runs
- Fees cover fund's running costs, affecting total net return

"Breaking the buck"


- Fund forced to liquidate its portfolio
- Massive pecuniary externalities (fire sales, etc.)

In normal times, spreads easily cover expenses, but when $r\downarrow$

- Suspend fees to avoid negative returns
- ...or avoid fee waivers by reaching for yield

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	1
000	0000000	0000	000	0	

Fee waiving during the crisis



▲ロト ▲圖 ト ▲ 画 ト ▲ 画 ト 一 画 … の Q ()

Appendix

Banks and Life Insurers 00000000 Money Market Funds

Pension Funds 000 Conclusion O

Appendix

Why are fees decreasing?

- Gross yields have become compressed around zero
- ► Fee reductions explained by low yields, not lower costs
- Does this make high cost funds reach for yield?

 $y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta_t [\text{Administrative costs}_{i,t}] + \gamma'_t x_i + e_{i,t}$

► y_{i,t} is a measure of risk-taking

Banks and Life Insurers

Money Market Funds

Pension Funds 000 Conclusion O Appendix

Results (Annual)

		Depende	nt variable:	
	Gross yield (1)	Std. dev. return (2)	Risky asset allocation (3)	Average maturity (4)
Right hand side variables:				
2007 incurred expenses (IV: 2005 value)	0.000	0.006	1.482	0.496
0000 1 (11/ 000/ 1)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(2.302)	(1.471)
2008 incurred expenses (IV: 2005 value)	0.125^+ (0.076)	0.060 (0.045)	0.630 (4.007)	-1.833 (2.067)
2009 incurred expenses (IV: 2005 value)	0.184*	0.058	-0.725	-2.996
2010 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.078)	(0.041)	(4.808)	(2.535)
2010 incurred expenses (IV: 2005 value)	0.064** (0.016)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.744 (5.333)	-2.091 (2.106)
2011 incurred expenses (IV: 2005 value)	0.049*	0.018**	2.571	-1.549
	(0.024)	(0.005)	(7.387)	(3.289)
2012 incurred expenses (IV: 2005 value)	0.029 (0.019)	0.011 (0.008)	5.952 (7.299)	-5.504 (4.024)
2013 incurred expenses (IV: 2005 value)	0.013	0.002	1.362	-4.455
	(0.012)	(0.005)	(7.504)	(3.749)
Sample period	2006-13	2006-13	2006-13	2006-13
Fund FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-varying controls	Yes	Yes	No	No
2013 first stage F statistic	149.6	149.6	382.0	352.3
Unique funds	379	379	135	379
Fund sponsor clusters	76	76	65	76
Observations	3,032	3,032	1,080	3,032

Banks and 000000

Banks and Life Insurers

Money Market Funds 0000 Pension Funds •00 onclusion

Appendix

Pension Funds: Institutional

Documented facts regarding risk taking:

- 1. PFs reduce risk exposure as liability duration decreases
- 2. Underfunded PFs take less risk (opposite of risk shifting)
- Does this behavior change when interest rates are low?

Plan measures:

- 1. Liability duration: benefit expenses / assets
- 2. Solvency: NPV of benefits /assets

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
000	0000000	0000	000	0	
- · ·					

Specification

Two measures of risk-taking:

- 1. Annual return on assets, total earnings on investments divided by assets plus one-half of net contributions
- 2. Standard deviation of the fund's return in the 2004-08 and 2009-12 periods

How did funds with different measures load on market excess returns?

 $y_{i,t} = \gamma[r_{m,t}^{e}][\text{Plan measure}]_{i,t} + \mathbb{I}\{t \ge 2006\}\gamma_t[r_{m,t}^{e}][\text{Plan measure}]_{i,t} + \text{Controls}$

Banks and Life Insurers 00000000 Money Market Funds

Pension Funds

Conclusion

Appendix

Pension Funds: Results

	Plan measure:				
	Benefits	/ Assets	Bene	fits NPV / A	Assets
		Deper	ndent variable	(p.p.):	
	$r_{i,t}$	$\sigma(r_{i,t})$	$r_{i,t}$	$\sigma\left(r_{i,t}\right)$	$r_{i,t}$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Right hand side variables:					
r ^e _m X (Plan measure)	-0.67**		-0.13^{**}		
$r_m \propto (Plan measure)$	(0.12)		(0.03)		
2006 X r ^e _m X (Plan measure)	(0.12)		(0.03)		-0.07^{*}
2000 A r_m A (r ian measure)					(0.03)
2007 X r ^e _m X (Plan measure)	-0.32		-0.45^{+}		0.63
$2001 \Lambda T_m \Lambda$ (Fian measure)	(1.14)		(0.27)		(0.55)
2008 X r ^e _m X (Plan measure)	0.10		(0.21)		(0.00)
2000 H m H (H kin moustic)	(0.14)				
2009 X r ^e _m X (Plan measure)	0.52**		0.33**		0.14^{**}
<i>m</i> (, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(0.13)		(0.03)		(0.02)
2010 X r ^e _m X (Plan measure)	0.32*		0.13**		0.04
	(0.14)		(0.03)		(0.03)
2011 X r_m^e X (Plan measure)	0.41		-6.38^{**}		-5.32**
	(3.47)		(1.01)		(1.32)
2012 X r_m^e X (Plan measure)	0.08		0.07^{+}		0.05^{+}
	(0.17)		(0.04)		(0.03)
$\sigma(r_m^e) \ge (Plan measure)$		-0.36^{**}		0.01	
		(0.11)		(0.02)	
2009 X $\sigma(r_m^e)$ X (Plan measure)		0.24*		0.18**	
		(0.11)		(0.03)	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Size, age controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Fund FE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Fund-specific r_m^e loading	No	No	No	No 2 177	Yes
Unique funds Fund sponsor clusters	4,225 3,719	3,580	3,665 3,177	3,177	3,665
Observations	29,575	3,186 7,160	21,990	2,806 6,353	3,177 21,990
ODSCI VARIOUS	20,010	7,100	21,990	0,000	21,990

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
000	0000000	0000	000	•	

Conclusion

- High frequency event studies: monetary policy had a strong stabilizing impact on banks and life insurers
- These suggest a recapitalizing effect of monetary policy
- Some evidence of modest risk-taking in MMFs and pension funds

◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆三▶ ◆三▶ 三三 のへぐ

Banks and Life Insurers 00000000 Money Market Funds 0000 Pension Funds 000 Conclusion


Appendix

Monetary Policy Surprises

Episode	Date	Time	Event	Effect on 5yr Treasury note ⁴
				(Basis points)
QE1	December 1, 2008	1:45pm	Bernanke speech	-9.2
QE1	December 16, 2008	2:21 pm	FOMC statement	-16.8
QE1	January 28, 2009	2:15pm	FOMC statement	3.1
QE1	March 18, 2009	2:17 pm	FOMC statement	-22.8
QE1	September 23, 2009	2:16 pm	FOMC statement	-8.9
QE2	August 10, 2010	2:14 pm	FOMC statement	-5.8
QE2	September 21, 2010	2:14pm	FOMC statement	-1.8
\mathbf{FG}	August 9, 2011	2:18 pm	FOMC statement	-14.4
FG	January 25, 2012	12:28 pm	FOMC statement	-6.3
QE3	September 13, 2012	12:31pm	FOMC statement	6.4
QE3	May 22, 2013	$10:30 \mathrm{am}$	Bernanke testimony	6.6
QE3	June 19, 2013	2:00 pm	FOMC statement	7.8
QE3	July 10, 2013	4:45pm	Bernanke speech	-7.3
QE3	September 18, 2013	2:00 pm	FOMC statement	-14

Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
000	0000000	0000	000	0	

Bank Holding Companies: Results



◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆臣▶ ◆臣▶ ─臣 ─の�@

ivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds
0	0000000	0000

Mot


Pension Funds 000 Conclusion O

(日) (同) (日) (日)

æ


Appendix

Bank Holding Companies: Results



Motivation	Banks and Life Insurers	Money Market Funds	Pension Funds	Conclusion	Appendix
000	0000000	0000	000	0	

Bank Holding Companies: Results




Motivation	
000	

Banks and Life Insurers

Money Market Funds 0000 Pension Funds 000 Conclusion O Appendix

Why are MMF fees decreasing?



◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆臣▶ ◆臣▶ ○臣 - の々ぐ