A simple model of trading and pricing risky assets under ambiguity: any lessons for policy-makers?

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## Introduction

• How does the presence of ambiguity averse investors influence asset prices?

• What are the policy implications?

• Risk-free bond in zero net supply, trades at period zero at unit price, and yields a return  $r^{f}$  in period one.

• Risky asset in positive supply  $\overline{z}$ , trades at time zero at price q, and yields stochastic payoff d in period one

$$\boldsymbol{d} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\mu_{\boldsymbol{I}} + \mu_{\boldsymbol{S}}, \sigma_{\boldsymbol{I}}^2 + \sigma_{\boldsymbol{S}}^2\right)$$

#### Model: Agents

• Two types of agents: m = SEU, AA (  $(1 - \alpha)$  and  $\alpha$  respectively).

• Period-zero budget constraint

$$w_0^m = qz^m + b^m$$

• End-of-period-one real wealth

$$w_1^m = z^m \frac{d}{1+i} + b^m \left(1+r^f\right)$$

• SEU investors perceive  $w_1^{SEU}$  as

$$w_1^{SEU} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(z^{SEU} rac{\mu_I + \mu_S}{1+i} + b^{SEU}\left(1+r^f
ight), \left(z^{SEU}
ight)^2 rac{\sigma_I^2 + \sigma_S^2}{\left(1+i
ight)^2}
ight)$$

## Model: SEU Asset Demand

$$\max_{z^{SEU}, b^{SEU}} E^{SEU} \left( -\exp\left(-w_1^{SEU}\right) \right) = \\ \max_{z^{SEU}, b^{SEU}} \left[ z^{SEU} \left( \frac{\mu_I + \mu_S}{1+i} - q \right) + b^{SEU} r^f + w_0 - \frac{1}{2} \left( z^{SEU} \right)^2 \frac{\sigma_I^2 + \sigma_S^2}{(1+i)^2} \right]$$

## Model: SEU Asset Demand

FOC

$$\left(\frac{\mu_I + \mu_S}{1+i} - q\right) - z^{SEU} \frac{\sigma_I^2 + \sigma_S^2}{\left(1+i\right)^2} = 0$$

FOC should be

$$\left[\frac{\mu_{I}+\mu_{S}}{1+i}-q\left(1+r^{f}\right)\right]-z^{SEU}\frac{\sigma_{I}^{2}+\sigma_{S}^{2}}{\left(1+i\right)^{2}}=0$$

## Model: SEU Asset Demand

$$z^{SEU} = \begin{cases} \frac{(1+i)[\mu_l + \mu_S - q(1+i)]}{\sigma_l^2 + \sigma_S^2} > 0 & \text{if } \frac{\mu_l + \mu_S}{1+i} > q\\ 0 & \text{if } \frac{\mu_l + \mu_S}{1+i} = q\\ \frac{(1+i)[\mu_l + \mu_S - q(1+i)]}{\sigma_l^2 + \sigma_S^2} < 0 & \text{if } \frac{\mu_l + \mu_S}{1+i} < q \end{cases}$$

#### Model: AA Asset Demand

$$\max_{z^{AA}, b^{AA}} \min_{\left(\mu_{I}, \sigma_{I}^{2}\right) \in \{\mu_{1}, \dots, \mu_{P}\} \times \left\{\sigma_{1}^{2}, \dots, \sigma_{Q}^{2}\right\}} E^{AA} \left(-\exp\left(-w_{1}^{AA}\right)\right) = \\ \max_{z^{AA}, b^{AA}} \min_{\left(\mu_{I}, \sigma_{I}^{2}\right) \in \{\mu_{1}, \dots, \mu_{P}\} \times \left\{\sigma_{1}^{2}, \dots, \sigma_{Q}^{2}\right\}} \left[z^{AA} \left(\frac{\mu_{I} + \mu_{S}}{1 + i} - q\right) + b^{AA}r^{f} + w_{0} - \frac{\left(z^{AA}\right)^{2} \left(\sigma_{I}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right)}{2\left(1 + i\right)^{2}}\right]$$

$$z^{AA} = \begin{cases} \frac{(1+i)[\mu_{\min} + \mu_{S} - q(1+i)]}{\sigma_{\max}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}} & \text{if} & \frac{\mu_{\min} + \mu_{S}}{1+i} > q\\ 0 & \text{if} & \frac{\mu_{\min} + \mu_{S}}{1+i} \le q \le \frac{\mu_{\max} + \mu_{S}}{1+i}\\ \frac{(1+i)[\mu_{\max} + \mu_{S} - q(1+i)]}{\sigma_{\max}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}} & \text{if} & \frac{\mu_{\max} + \mu_{S}}{1+i} < q \end{cases}$$

## Model: Demand Functions



#### Model: Equilibrium Asset Prices - case 1

If the following condition holds

$$\mu_{\min} \leq \mu_{I} - \frac{\overline{z} \left(\sigma_{I}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right)}{\left(1 - \alpha\right) \left(1 + i\right)}$$

then only SEU investors participate in the market and the equilibrium price is

$$q_{1}^{*} = \frac{\mu_{I} + \mu_{S}}{1+i} - \frac{\overline{z} \left(\sigma_{I}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right)}{\left(1-\alpha\right)\left(1+i\right)^{2}}$$

#### Model: Equilibrium Asset Prices - case 2

lf

$$\mu_{\min} > \mu_{I} - \frac{\overline{z} \left(\sigma_{I}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right)}{\left(1 - \alpha\right) \left(1 + i\right)}$$

then both groups of investors participate, and the equilibrium price is

$$q_{2}^{*} = \frac{\left[\alpha \mu_{\min} \left(\sigma_{l}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right) + \mu_{S} \left(\alpha \sigma_{l}^{2} + (1 - \alpha) \sigma_{\max}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right) + (1 - \alpha) \mu_{I} \left(\sigma_{\max}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right)\right]}{(1 + i) \left[\sigma_{S}^{2} + \alpha \sigma_{l}^{2} + (1 - \alpha) \sigma_{\max}^{2}\right]} - \frac{\overline{z} \left(\sigma_{l}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right) \left(\sigma_{\max}^{2} + \sigma_{S}^{2}\right)}{(1 + i)^{2} \left[\sigma_{S}^{2} + \alpha \sigma_{l}^{2} + (1 - \alpha) \sigma_{\max}^{2}\right]}$$

## Risk Premia Under Ambiguity

• Define the real risk premium (under  $r^f = 0$ ) as

$$E_{(j)}\left(1+\widetilde{R}\right)\equiv rac{E\left(d
ight)}{\left(1+i
ight)q^{*}}$$

• In the case of equilibrium with SEU only

$$E_{(1)}\left(1+\widetilde{R}\right)=\frac{E^{SEU}\left(d\right)}{\left(1+i\right)q_{1}^{*}}$$

• In the equilibrium with participation of both types

$$E_{(2)}\left(1+\widetilde{R}\right) = \frac{\alpha E^{AA}\left(d\right) + (1-\alpha) E^{SEU}\left(d\right)}{\left(1+i\right)q_{2}^{*}}$$

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• In turns out that  $E_{(2)}\left(1+\widetilde{R}\right) > E_{(1)}\left(1+\widetilde{R}\right)$ 

# Affecting the diffusion of AA behaviours ( $\alpha$ )

• Both types of investors participate initially,

 $\alpha \downarrow \Rightarrow q_2^* \uparrow \Rightarrow q_2^*$  may enter into the region of nonparticipation by AA investors.

• If initially only SEU investors participate,

 $\alpha \uparrow \Rightarrow q_1^* \downarrow \Rightarrow q_1^*$  may enter into a region where AA investors are willing to participate.

Changing the amount of ambiguity-relevant uncertainty  $(\mu_{\min} \text{ and } \sigma_{\max}^2)$ 

- If initially only SEU investors participate in the market, then variation in  $\sigma^2_{\max}$  has no effect on the market.
- If initially both groups of investors are participating,

   *σ*<sup>2</sup><sub>max</sub> ↓⇒ *z*<sup>AA</sup> ↑⇒ *q*<sup>\*</sup><sub>2</sub> ↑⇒ *q*<sup>\*</sup><sub>2</sub> may enter into the region of nonparticipation by AA investors.

- Ambiguity about the distribution of the systematic component of asset payoff (μ<sub>S</sub>, σ<sup>2</sup><sub>S</sub>)?
- Welfare implications?

If only SEU investors participate

$$\begin{aligned} q_1^* &= \frac{\mu_l + \mu_S}{1 + i} - \frac{\overline{z} \left( \sigma_l^2 + \sigma_S^2 \right)}{(1 - \alpha)(1 + i)^2} \\ z^{AA} &= 0 \\ z^{SEU} &= \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha)} \overline{z} \\ b^{AA} &= w_0^{AA} \\ b^{SEU} &= w_0^{SEU} - q_1^* z^{SEU} = w_0^{SEU} - \left( \frac{\mu_l + \mu_S}{1 + i} - \frac{\overline{z} \left( \sigma_l^2 + \sigma_S^2 \right)}{(1 - \alpha)(1 + i)^2} \right) \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha)} \overline{z} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{split} \alpha b^{AA} + (1-\alpha) \, b^{SEU} &= 0 \Rightarrow \\ \alpha w_0^{AA} + (1-\alpha) \left[ w_0^{SEU} - \left( \frac{\mu_l + \mu_S}{1+i} - \frac{\overline{z} \left( \sigma_l^2 + \sigma_S^2 \right)}{(1-\alpha)(1+i)^2} \right) \frac{1}{(1-\alpha)} \overline{z} \right] = 0 \\ \alpha w_0^{AA} + (1-\alpha) \, w_0^{SEU} &= \overline{z} \left( \frac{\mu_l + \mu_S}{1+i} - \frac{\overline{z} \left( \sigma_l^2 + \sigma_S^2 \right)}{(1-\alpha)(1+i)^2} \right) \end{split}$$