

Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral

Kubler and Schmedders - *Econometrica* 2003

Sargent's Reading Group

NYU - 17 April 2007

Motivation

- ▶ Asset pricing model with:
 - ▷ infinitely lived heterogeneous agents;
 - ▷ collateral constraints and default;
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- ▶ Existence of a Markov equilibrium: a policy map (from exogenous shock and current distribution of financial wealth to current prices and choices) and a transition map.
- ▶ Algorithm to approximate this mapping numerically.
- ▶ Example of a simple economy; welfare gains from collateralization and equilibrium default.

Model

- ▶ $1, \dots, H$ agents. Each h maximizes $E \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_h^t u_h(c_t, y_t) \right\}$ with $u_h(\cdot, y)$ unbounded below $\forall y$.

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- ▶ $1, \dots, A$ physical assets (trees). Initial ownership structure of each a given and $\sum_h \theta_a^h(\sigma_0^*) = 1$.
- ▶ $1, \dots, J$ financial assets. If h sells 1 unit of security j at node σ , he must hold $k_a^j(\sigma)$ dollars worth of each tree a , with k_a^j a stationary function of current shock y and current endogenous variables.


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
$$e^h(\sigma) = e^h(y)$$

$$\sum_a \theta_a^h(\sigma^*) q_a(\sigma)$$

$$\sum_j \phi_j^h(\sigma^*) f_j(\sigma)$$

$$f_j(\sigma) = \min \left\{ b_j(y), \sum_a k_a^j(\sigma^*) \frac{q_a(\sigma)}{q_a(\sigma^*)} \right\}, \quad \text{i.e. partial default}$$

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choices:

$$c^h(\sigma)$$

$$\sum_a \theta_a^h(\sigma^*) q_a(\sigma) \quad \sum_a \theta_a^h(\sigma) [q_a(\sigma) - d_a^h(y)]$$

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Financial Markets Equilibrium

- ▶ For all σ, h, a, j , a collection of:
 - ▷ share holdings $\theta_a^h(\sigma) \geq 0$ and asset holdings $\phi_j^h(\sigma)$;
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▶ Each agent h maximizes expected utility subject to:

$$\begin{aligned} i) \quad c^h(\sigma) + \sum_a \theta_a^h(\sigma) [q_a(\sigma) - d_a^h(y)] + \sum_j \phi_j^h(\sigma) p_j(\sigma) = \\ = e^h(y) + \sum_j \phi_j^h(\sigma^*) f_j(\sigma) + \sum_a \theta_a^h(\sigma^*) q_a(\sigma), \quad \forall \sigma \end{aligned}$$

$$ii) \quad q_a \theta_a^h(\sigma) + \sum_{j: \phi_j^h(\sigma) < 0} k_a^j \phi_j^h(\sigma) \geq 0, \quad \forall a$$

Existence of Markov Equilibrium

- Financial wealth with $\Omega(\sigma) = (\omega^1(\sigma), \dots, \omega^H(\sigma))$:

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- ▶ Markov equilibrium:
 - ▷ nonempty valued policy correspondence mapping from current exogenous shock y and financial wealth distribution $\Omega(\sigma)$ to current prices $q_a(\sigma), p_j(\sigma)$ and choices $c^h(\sigma), \theta_a^h(\sigma), \phi_j^h(\sigma)$;
 - ▷ transition function mapping from current state to tomorrow's endogenous states, consistent with optimality;
 - ▷ “simple” if the associated policy correspondence is single valued.

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- ▶ Markov equilibrium:
 - ▷ Lemma: is a financial markets equilibrium;
 - ▷ Theorem: there exists a Markov equilibrium with nonempty policy correspondence.

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- ▶ Interpretation and caveat.
- ▶ Practical improvement over existing algorithms, which cannot consider models with more than two assets. Here, dimension of the domain of the equilibrium map is independent of the of the number of securities traded.

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 - ▷ compute the new approximation ρ^{n+1} by interpolation;
 - ▷ if $\sup_{y,\Omega} \|\rho^{n+1} - \rho^n\| < \delta$ not satisfied, set $n = n + 1$; if it is satisfied, compute the maximum relative error in the Euler equations; if it is not below ε , start again with lower δ ; if it is, stop.

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- ▶ 1 tree with dividend $d = 0.3\bar{e}$.
- ▶ Endowments $e^1 = (1.386; 2.205; 5.544; 5.145)$; $e^2 = 0.7\bar{e} - e^1$.


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- ▶ Transition probabilities:

$$\begin{pmatrix} .4 & .4 & .1 & .1 \\ .4 & .4 & .1 & .1 \\ .1 & .1 & .4 & .4 \\ .1 & .1 & .4 & .4 \end{pmatrix}$$


Example: welfare gains

- ▶ Welfare gains (for agent 1) from introducing the possibility of trading 1 risk-free bond backed by collateral ($k = 1.3$ across states) and with $y_0 = 1$.



Example: welfare gains

- ▶ Welfare gains (for agent 2) from introducing the possibility of trading 1 risk-free bond backed by collateral ($k = 1.3$ across states) and with $y_0 = 1$.



Example: margin requirements

- ▶ Default rates as a function of k .
- ▶ Welfare gains and losses (in %) with respect to $k = 1.3$ and for different initial wealth levels.

k	1.02	1.05	1.1	1.15	1.2
Default rate	25.9	19.2	5.9	0.05	0
$\Omega = (0.1, 0.9)$	(-0.12, 0.08)	(-0.07, 0.05)	(0.11, 0.03)	(0.32, 0.03)	(0.19, 0.02)
$\Omega = (0.5, 0.5)$	(-0.01, 0.0)	(-0.01, 0.0)	(0.0, 0.0)	(0.02, 0.01)	(0.01, 0.0)
$\Omega = (0.9, 0.1)$	(0.05, -0.05)	(0.03, -0.01)	(0.02, 0.02)	(0.02, 0.03)	(0.01, 0.02)

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- ▶ Maximal errors lie between $5 \cdot 10^{-5}$ and 10^{-5} evaluated on a grid of 10.000 points (β^h vary between 0.94995 and 0.95005).
- ▶ Portfolio policy functions (300 knots for the spline approx.):

