

# The Corporate Propensity to Save

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# The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash

In a recent paper Almeida, Campello and Weisbach run the following OLS cross-sectional regressions

$$\Delta \text{CashHoldings}_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{CashFlow}_{i,t} + \alpha_2 Q_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \text{Size}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

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$\alpha_1$  is the "firm's propensity to save cash out of cash flows"

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**Formal explanation:** three periods model of liquidity demand with full capital depreciation

# Problems

- static cross-sectional regressions are affected by a relevant endogeneity problem
- $Q_{i,t}$  is measured with errors  $\Rightarrow$  errors in variables problem
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Solution proposed by Riddick and Whited:

- Dynamic trade-off theory model with costly external equity financing and costly internal corporate savings
- Better econometrics: error-in-variables model

# Production Technology

- Risk neutral firm in a discrete-time, infinite-horizon, partial-equilibrium framework
- Profit function:  $\pi(k, z)$  continuous and concave
- $z$  is a first-order markov process with support  $[\underline{z}, \bar{z}]$  and law of motion given by  $g(z', z)$
- Standard capital accumulation equation:  $k' = I + (1 - d)k$
- Capital adjustment costs:

$$A(k, k') = ck\phi_i + \frac{a}{2} \left( \frac{k' - (1-d)k}{k} \right)^2$$

$\phi_i$  is an indicator function equal to 1 if investment is different from zero

# Financing Technology

Firm's budget constraint:

$$e = \underbrace{(1 - \tau_c)\pi(k, z) + p}_{\text{Beginning of period C. H.}} - \underbrace{\frac{p'}{(1 + r(1 - \tau))}}_{\text{Corporate Savings}} - \underbrace{(k' - (1 - d)k) - A(k, k')}_{\text{Investment Cost}}$$

Equity issuance cost paid if  $e < 0$

$$\phi(e) = \Phi_e \left( -\lambda_0 + \lambda_1 e + \frac{1}{2} \lambda_2 e^2 \right)$$

$\Phi_e$  is an indicator function equal to 1 if  $e$  is negative and  $\lambda_i > 0 \ i = 0, 1, 2$



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$1 + (1 - \tau_c)r$  is the internal accumulation rate  $\Rightarrow$  trade-off between costly external financing and costly internal savings

## Recursive Formulation

$$V(k, p, z) = \max_{k', p'} \left\{ e + \phi_e + \frac{1}{1+r} \int V(k, p, z) dg(z', z) \right\}$$

s.t.

$$e = (1 - \tau_c)\pi(k, z) + p - \frac{p'}{(1+r(1-\tau_c))} - (k' - (1-d)k) - A(k, k')$$

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A unique optimal saving policy function exists. The FOC w.r.t.  $p'$  is:

$$\underbrace{1 + (\lambda_1 - \lambda_2 e)\Phi_e}_{\text{Shadow value of Cash Balance}} = \underbrace{\frac{1 + (1 - \tau_c)r}{1+r} \int (1 + (\lambda_1 - \lambda_2 e')\Phi'_e) dg(z', z)}_{\text{Marginal Cost of Equity Financing}}$$

# Calibration


Functional Form	Parameters
$\pi(k, z) = zk^\theta$	$\theta = 0.75$
$\ln(z') = \rho \ln(z) + v'$	$\rho = 0.66$
$v' \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)$	$\sigma_v^2 = 0.121$
Financing Cost	$\lambda_0 = 0.389 \quad \lambda_1 = 0.053 \quad \lambda_2 = 0.002$
Adjustment Cost	$c = 0.039 \quad a = 0.049$
Depreciation	$d = 0.15$
Risk-free interest rate	$r = 0.04$

# Optimal Policies: Small Firm


Savings are defined as  $(\frac{p'}{1+(1-\tau_c)r} - p)/k^*$

Small Firm

HIGH MARGINAL PRODUCT OF CAPITAL



# Optimal Policies: Large Firm



## The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Cash





$$\frac{p' - p}{k} = \alpha_0 + \beta \frac{V(k, p, z)}{k} + \alpha_1 \frac{\pi(k, z)}{k} + \alpha_2 \ln(k) + u \quad (1)$$

Assess the change of some key model's parameters on the magnitude of the coefficient  $\alpha_1$ , e.g. let  $\rho$  to vary in  $[-0.8, 0.8]$  and leave all the other parameters at their calibrated values.

Testable implications:

- $\alpha_1$  is negative
- $\alpha_1$  increases in absolute value with the cost of external financing
- $\alpha_1$  increases in absolute value as  $\rho$  increases
- $\alpha_1$  decreases in absolute value with the volatility of cash flows

# Testable Implications





# Empirical Strategy

- Data relative to USA from Compustat and data relative to Canada, Japan, Germany, France and United Kingdom from Standard and Poor's Compustat Global Issue
- Estimation using a classical errors-in-variables model (Erickson and Whited 2000, 2002)

$$y_i = \omega_i \alpha + \chi_i \beta + u_i$$

$$x_i = \gamma + \chi_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$\chi_i$ : variable measured with errors

$\gamma_i$ : variable perfectly measured

- Third moments GMM estimation

# Results

Country	OLS			GMM4			
	$q$	$CF$	$R^2$	$q$	$CF$	$R^2$	$\tau^2$
United States	0.029*† (0.003)	0.103*† (0.009)	0.112*† (0.010)	0.283*† (0.016)	-0.397*† (0.060)	0.440*† (0.031)	0.255*† (0.014)
Canada	0.045*† (0.006)	0.053*† (0.025)	0.144*† (0.026)	0.213*† (0.018)	-0.076*† (0.022)	0.495*† (0.051)	0.323*† (0.041)
United Kingdom	0.009† (0.002)	0.103*† (0.016)	0.047*† (0.013)	0.427 (0.076)	-0.485*† (0.168)	0.356*† (0.042)	0.137*† (0.026)
Japan	0.019*† (0.002)	0.141*† (0.019)	0.049*† (0.005)	0.318*† (0.040)	-0.162*† (0.037)	0.255*† (0.020)	0.113*† (0.015)
France	0.021*† (0.003)	0.126*† (0.033)	0.084*† (0.013)	0.263*† (0.084)	-0.304*† (0.097)	0.303*† (0.060)	0.226*† (0.060)
Germany	0.018† (0.004)	0.078*† (0.020)	0.082*† (0.018)	0.310*† (0.073)	-0.200*† (0.087)	0.354*† (0.069)	0.122*† (0.025)

# Results

Subsample	OLS			GMM4			
	$q$	$CF$	$R^2$	$q$	$CF$	$R^2$	$\tau^2$
Small	0.045* <sup>†</sup> (0.004)	0.134* <sup>†</sup> (0.011)	0.166* <sup>†</sup> (0.015)	0.265* <sup>†</sup> (0.019)	-0.147* <sup>†</sup> (0.071)	0.522* <sup>†</sup> (0.034)	0.300* <sup>†</sup> (0.020)
Large	0.006* <sup>†</sup> (0.001)	0.083* <sup>†</sup> (0.008)	0.046* <sup>†</sup> (0.006)	0.281* <sup>†</sup> (0.054)	-0.856* <sup>†</sup> (0.172)	0.183* <sup>†</sup> (0.027)	0.342* <sup>†</sup> (0.031)
No Bond Rating	0.032* <sup>†</sup> (0.003)	0.110* <sup>†</sup> (0.010)	0.122* <sup>†</sup> (0.012)	0.244* <sup>†</sup> (0.023)	-0.247* <sup>†</sup> (0.068)	0.444* <sup>†</sup> (0.036)	0.291* <sup>†</sup> (0.038)
Bond Rating	0.016* <sup>†</sup> (0.003)	0.046 <sup>†</sup> (0.015)	0.070* <sup>†</sup> (0.009)	0.219* <sup>†</sup> (0.030)	-0.815* <sup>†</sup> (0.130)	0.254* <sup>†</sup> (0.034)	0.417 (0.022)
High Standard Deviation	0.037* <sup>†</sup> (0.004)	0.128* <sup>†</sup> (0.008)	0.150* <sup>†</sup> (0.013)	0.315* <sup>†</sup> (0.062)	-0.274* <sup>†</sup> (0.090)	0.517* <sup>†</sup> (0.037)	0.264* <sup>†</sup> (0.018)
Low Standard Deviation	0.014* <sup>†</sup> (0.002)	0.081* <sup>†</sup> (0.009)	0.058* <sup>†</sup> (0.008)	0.299* <sup>†</sup> (0.098)	-0.836* <sup>†</sup> (0.280)	0.322* <sup>†</sup> (0.033)	0.366* <sup>†</sup> (0.025)
High Serial Correlation	0.023* <sup>†</sup> (0.003)	0.088* <sup>†</sup> (0.009)	0.102* <sup>†</sup> (0.008)	0.248* <sup>†</sup> (0.025)	-0.579* <sup>†</sup> (0.072)	0.380* <sup>†</sup> (0.033)	0.344* <sup>†</sup> (0.017)
Low Serial Correlation	0.033* <sup>†</sup> (0.004)	0.122* <sup>†</sup> (0.009)	0.122* <sup>†</sup> (0.011)	0.213* <sup>†</sup> (0.025)	-0.074 (0.045)	0.416* <sup>†</sup> (0.037)	0.266* <sup>†</sup> (0.018)

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- The dynamic model has uncovered an important SUBSTITUTION mechanism that the simple one-period model by ACW is not able to explain:  
positive productivity shock  $\Rightarrow$  more productive capital  $\Rightarrow$  firms dissave and invest  $\Rightarrow$  negative cash flow sensitivity of cash
- Another example of dynamic trade-off model of the firm that provides theoretical guidance for a better econometric practice in corporate finance